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LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION V. VELAZQUEZ: THE
COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAM RESTRICTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment's free speech clause is one of the most widely
cherished and debated constitutional rights in America. Today, discus-
sions involving the First Amendment take center stage in our newspa-
pers, on our televisions and over the Internet. Racists and white su-
premacists join hands with journalists and politicians alike to proclaim
the virtues of the right to free speech. One topic of this debate receiving
little publicity is the relationship between the legal profession and the
First Amendment. Our society rarely rallies around lawyers. Yet, the
recent Supreme Court decision of Legal Services Corporation v. Velaz-
quez' provides a rare opportunity for free speech supporters to rally
around litigators. Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") supporters
achieved a rare victory against staunch conservatives in Congress who
continue chipping away at their program. This comment examines the
circumstances surrounding the case and it's legal issues.
This comment first outlines a factual context of the Legal Services
Corporation, and the details that laid the foundation for the instant law-
suit. Second, this comment explores the relevant legal background, and
articulates the pertinent legal issues surrounding this case. Third, this
comment examines the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opin-
ions. Next, this comment analyzes the case from a public policy perspec-
tive and attempts to predict the effect the Court's decision may have on
the Legal Services Corporation. Lastly, this comment expresses discon-
tent for the current state of the law in this area, proposes a clearer legal
framework for determining the constitutionality of government program
restrictions, and challenges the Supreme Court to clarify the befuddled
state of the law so lawyers, Congress and judges can more accurately
predict the outcome of such constitutional legal disputes.
II. BACKGROUND OF LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
The Legal Services Corporation's roots can be traced back to Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty.2 As part of this program,
1. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
2. See William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid:
Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960's to the 1990's, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB.
L. REV. 241, 245 (1998); see also J. Dwight Yoder, Justice or Injustice for the Poor?: A Look at the
Constitutionality of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827,
833 (1998) (discussing the establishment of the Legal Services Program in 1966).
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Congress created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to operate
programs to assist with poverty in the United States, including legal
services to the poor.' Immediately, conservative political opposition
strove to eliminate this legal services program. Because of the contro-
versy surrounding the OEO's program, Congress and the Nixon admini-
stration "focused on establishing a congressionally funded, but politically
independent, legal services program."5
In 1974, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) as
a program that would provide legal services to those who would be "oth-
erwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel. 6 Congress declared that
the LSC "must be kept free from the influence of or use by it of political
pressures."' In accomplishing this goal, LSC attorneys were provided
with "full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients. 8
Since its inception, LSC funds, in the form of grants, have been
distributed to recipients who provide legal services to low-income indi-
viduals. 9 These grantees generally rely on LSC funding as well as monies
from a variety of other private and public sources.'0 LSC funds have been
described as "the primary vehicle for insuring that the poor are included
in this nation's legal system.""
Even with this public interest background, controversy has shrouded
the workings of LSC because of the increasing number of restrictions
placed on the "permissible uses of federal funds by recipient organiza-
tions."'2 In 1996, Congress restricted the allocation of LSC funds to pro-
hibit legal assistance for: lobbying activities, class action suits, aliens,
activism, attorney profits, abortion, criminals, and welfare reform.'3 Ad-
ditionally, LSC legislation prohibited grantees from providing legal as-
sistance for a restricted purpose even when the funds were generated
from other sources.14
The most controversial restriction (and at issue in the instant case)
involved welfare reform litigation. This restriction prohibited "LSC re-
cipients from participating in 'litigation challenging laws or regulations
3. See generally Quigley, supra note 2. The program was called the Legal Services Program.
4. Yoder, supra note 2, at 833.
5. Id.
6. 42 USCS § 2996(2).
7. Id. § 2996(5).
8. Id. § 2996(6).
9. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999), aff'd, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
10. Velazque 985 F. Supp. at 327.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescission and Appropriations Act of 1996, § 504, 110 Stat.
1321-53.
14. See id. § 504(d)(2)(B).
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enacted as part of an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare
system.""' 5 Recipients could provide legal assistance to individuals
seeking relief from a welfare agency; however, the restriction barred
suits involving "an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing" wel-
fare laws. 6 Understandably, LSC funded lawyers found this restriction
particularly prohibitive.
In response to these heightened restrictions, numerous individuals
and organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York against LSC, challenging the constitution-
ality of certain provisions of the Act by asserting that the restrictions
violate the First Amendment. 7 A separate group of plaintiffs filed a
similar suit in the federal District Court for the District of Hawaii in re-
sponse to the same 1996 restrictions.'8
11. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. Government Restriction vis-?i-vis First Amendment Rights
To fully understand the recent decision of Legal Services Corpora-
tion v. Velazquez, 9 one must understand the paradox between First
Amendment rights granted by the Constitution and government subsidies
that the Constitution does not require Congress to allocate. The question
ultimately becomes: if the government is not obligated by the Constitu-
tion to provide certain funding or programs, why should First Amend-
ment rights apply to the restrictions the government chooses to place on
the funding program? ° The government understandably wants to control
how budget dollars are spent; yet, in effectively constraining its budget,
First Amendment rights may be limited.2 ' Therefore, the Supreme Court
15. Megan Elizabeth Lewis, Subsidized Speech and the Legal Services Corporation: The
Constitutionality of Defunding Constitutional Challenges to the Welfare System, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1178, 1179-80 (1999) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 1639.3(a) (1997)).
16. 45 C.F.R. § 1639.4 (2001). See also Lewis, supra note 15, at 1180 (explaining the
limitations on LSC recipients).
17. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Original plaintiffs
included: Carmen Velazquez, WEP Workers Together!, Community Service Society of New York,
Inc., New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning, Contro Independiente De Trabajadores
Agricolas, Inc., Greater New York Labor-Religion Coalition, Farmworkers Legal Services of New
York, Inc., Lucy Billings, Peggy Earisman, Olive Karen Stamm, Jeanette Zelbof, Elisabeth
Benjamin, Jill Ann Boskey, Lauren Shapiro, Andrew Connick, Councilmember C. Virginia Fields,
Councilmember Guillermo Linares, Councilmember Stanley Michels, Councilmember Adam
Clayton Powell, IV, Senator Lawrence Seabrook, and Assemblyman Scott M. Stringer.
18. Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 1997).
19. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
20. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 1181; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989)(explaining the debate in terms of the
"government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly" versus "the greater power to deny a
benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt").
21. See Lewis, supra note 15 at 1181.
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has been charged with determining when those government restrictions
have gone so far as to violate the First Amendment.
B. Government Funding Restrictions Constitutional Analysis
In recent Supreme Court opinions, the Court has alluded to numerous
legal inquiries courts can use in examining constitutional challenges to
government restrictions. 2  Two legal issues often discussed in these types
of cases include: first, the relationship between the government and the
grantee of the government's subsidy must be characterized, and second,
the disputed restriction must be classified as viewpoint neutral or view-
point discriminatory.
1. Characterizing the relationship between the government and the
grantee.
The Supreme Court often discusses the relationship between "the
government and the recipient of federal funds upon whom the restrictions
are placed."23 Understanding this relationship can assist in determining
the constitutionality of a particular restriction on the government funded
24program. Grantees can either fall under a limited public forum or non-public forum characterization.25
The Supreme Court has explained that a limited public forum con-
sists of a place or organization that the State "has opened for use" for
expressive activity. 2 6 In essence, in programs that are intended to give a
limited public forum, the government "provides funding to independent
actors.27 Thus, the government retains control over the forum it created
through a specific program, yet the government "does not control the
independent actors participating in the forum. 28
On the other hand, the Court has explained that a nonpublic forum
consists of a place or organization that the government reserved for an
"intended purpose." 29 In this forum, the government funds individuals or
grantees to serve as government agents. 3° In a nonpublic forum, the gov-
ernment may regulate the "time, place, and manner regulations" and may
impose other restrictions reasonably necessary to maintain its intended
22. Often called the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1415.
23. Yoder, supra note 2, at 849.
24. See id.
25. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also
Nicole B. Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint
Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REv. 501, 521-22 (2000) (discussing viewpoint discrimination in the
limited public forum and nonpublic forum contexts).
26. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
27. Yoder, supra note 2, at 849.
28. Id. at 851.
29. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
30. See Yoder, supra note 2, at 849.
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purposes.3' Because these grantees are viewed as government agents, the
government is able to organize these programs in order to restrict or
promote certain policies and goals.
3 2
2. Viewpoint discrimination in regards to nonpublic forum and
limited public forum classification.
After determining whether the government program is classified as a
nonpublic forum or limited public forum program, only then does the
concept of viewpoint discrimination become important. Government
program restrictions falling under the nonpublic forum classification can
be both viewpoint discriminatory and constitutional, while those falling
under the limited public forum classification can be deemed unconstitu-
tional if viewpoint discriminatory.
a. Explanation of viewpoint discrimination
While the Supreme Courts' opinions as a whole have resulted in
"uncertainty about the meaning of viewpoint discrimination,"33 some
conclusions have been made to assist in articulating the meaning of
viewpoint discrimination, and its relationship to claims asserting First
Amendment violations. First, it is important to distinguish between
viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination.3' The distinction
between viewpoint and content discrimination proves important because,
historically, the Court has concluded that viewpoint discrimination may
violate the First Amendment, while content discrimination often will
not.35
Several cases provide examples of this distinction.36 Both Perry37 and
Rosenberger 8 observe that content discrimination involves discrimina-
tion against speech because of its subject matter, while viewpoint dis-
crimination involves discrimination because of the speaker's specific
motivating "ideology, opinion, or perspective.
39
Several cases examined the distinction in the context of educational
facilities. 0 For example, in Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that permit-
31. Id. See also Casarez, supra note 25, at 533.
32. See Yoder, supra note 2, at 849.
33. Casarez, supra note 25, at 505.
34. Content discrimination is sometimes referred to as subject matter discrimination. See id. at
508.
35. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
36. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
38. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
39. See id. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (explaining that content based discrimination must
be considered in light of a compelling state interest).
40. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
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ting school property to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the topic from a
religious standpoint discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.4' Again, in
Rosenberger, the Court concluded that the University did "not exclude
religion as a subject matter" but discriminated against journalistic en-
deavors with "religious editorial viewpoints.4 2 Both opinions found
viewpoint discrimination.
b. Speech within a limited public forum is unconstitutional if
viewpoint discriminatory
In most limited public forum cases,43 the Court consistently has held
any restriction deemed viewpoint discriminatory unconstitutional. 44 For
example, in Widmar, a case involving meeting facilities for student
groups in a university, the Court held that the First Amendment forbids
the government from enforcing exclusions from a limited public forum,
like those of a university, even if it was not required "to create the forum
in the first place."' 5
Further cases articulate the importance of viewpoint neutrality in
limited public forums.46 In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that a school
district authorizing public, after-hours use of school facilities for civic,
social, and entertainment, but not religious purposes constituted uncon-
stitutional viewpoint discrimination.47
The Rosenberger opinion further expanded the limits of this legal is-
sue, concluding that the university's student activity fee fund constituted
a "forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense,
but the same principles" regarding limited public forum applied to this
program.4s This line of cases clarifies that viewpoint discrimination in
limited public forums usually violates the First Amendment's free speech
clause.
41. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
42. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
43. Especially those involving public schools and universities. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at
393-94; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269
(1981).
44. See Casarez, supra note 25, at 522.
45. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (discussing public property which
the State has determined should be used for expressive activity); Casarez, supra note 25, at 524
(discussing the Widmar holding).
46. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Perry, 460 U.S. at
45.
47. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386.
48. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. See Casarez, supra note 25, at 526.
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c. Speech within a nonpublic forum is constitutional even if
viewpoint discriminatory
Speech, however, confined to a nonpublic forum likely will not be
held to the same strict standard as speech in a public forum. In one recent
case, viewpoint discrimination was allowed because the Court found
the government had created a nonpublic forum.5" The Court, in Rust, up-
held the government's Title X prohibition on abortion-related advice,
concluding that the government created a program to convey a particular
policy, not to encourage private speech.' The Rosenberger decision fur-
ther clarified Rust, explaining, "when a government appropriates public
funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes."5 Thus, appropriate forum classification becomes important in
discussing viewpoint discrimination.
C. Litigation is an activity protected by the First Amendment.
In analyzing viewpoint discrimination cases that violate the First
Amendment, the court grants certain trades special consideration. In par-
ticular, the press historically has been given broad First Amendment
protection. 53
The Supreme Court consistently has held that the government cannot
distribute subsidies to the press in a viewpoint discriminatory manner,
regardless of the government's intended purpose of the funding
program.M For instance, the Court asserted that broadcasters under the
First Amendment are entitled to exercise the "widest journalistic freedom
consistent with their public duties."' The Court explained that broadcast-
ers are engaged in a "vital and independent form of communicative ac-
tivity,' '56 and neither the FCC nor Congress can impose restrictions dis-
criminatory in viewpoint.
In subsequent cases, the Court further articulated the press' special
status in First Amendment claims. 7 The Court explained that the "First
Amendment of its own force does not compel public broadcasters to al-
low third parties access to their programming."' Allowing such access
49. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
50. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
51. See id.
52. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
53. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (upholding the free speech
right of newspapers).
54. See Casarez, supra note 25, at 545.
55. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984).
56. FCC, 468 U.S. at 378.
57. Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
58. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675.
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would result in a "further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broad-
casters." 59
The Supreme Court has also classified litigation as a specially pro-
tected First Amendment activity.60 In fact, the Court has concluded that
litigation is entitled to the highest level of protection under the First
Amendment. 6' The Court made special note that litigation was one of the
few avenues available to minorities seeking redress for their grievances,
and full access to the judicial system may be the most effective method
of communicating minority groups' "ideas and beliefs of our society." 62
Numerous decisions since Button have reaffirmed and expanded the
notion that the First Amendment specially protects litigation.63 Most re-
cently, in Polk County v. Dodson,64 the Court held that counsel should be
"free of state control," and the client should receive "the services of an
effective and independent advocate., 65 Thus, like the press, litigation has
been deemed a specially protected activity under the First Amendment.
IV. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION V. VELAZQUEZ
A. Procedural History
The instant case was filed in the District Court, alleging the restric-
tions on the use of LSC funds violated the First and Fifth Amendments.
The court held that the four contentious restrictions 66 were a "permissible
construction" of the Act, as well as appropriately "tailored to the gov-
ernment's legitimate interests., 67 Thus, the court denied Plaintiffs re-
quest for a preliminary injunction.68
On appeal to the Second Circuit,69 the court upheld three restrictions
as constitutional because they all prohibited the LSC grantees' involve-
ment, regardless of the viewpoint. 70 However, the court reversed the de-
59. Id.
60. See Jessica A. Roth, It is Lawyers We are Funding: A Constitutional Challenge to the
1996 Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 107, 111 (1998).
61. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
62. Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
63. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich.,
401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v. I11. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of
R.R. Trainmen v. Va., 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
64. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
65. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 312.
66. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 323. See also supra notes 13-16,
71-73 and accompanying text.
67. Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at 326-27.
68. See id. at 327.
69. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d at 757, 757 (2nd Cir. 1999) afd, 531 U.S.
533 (2001).
70. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 768-73.
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nial of a preliminary injunction with respect to § 504(a)(16), 7' the restric-
tion preventing LSC grantees from challenging existing welfare rules.'
2
The majority opinion held the qualification in the welfare restriction con-
stituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination and, thus, violated the
First Amendment.73 Thereafter, LSC filed a petition for certiorari chal-
lenging the Second Circuit's opinion, and the Supreme Court granted its
request.
B. Supreme Court Oinion
The Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit's decision, basing
74their conclusion on several lines of reasoning.
1. Viewpoint based restrictions are improper when the government
program was designed to facilitate private speech.
The Court determined that the LSC program was intended to "fa-
cilitate private speech, not promote a government message., 7- The Court
contrasted the LSC program with the Title X program in Rust, explaining
that Title X was intended as an outlet for the government to promote its
own policies or advance a particular idea, thereby giving the government
a wider latitude to impose restrictions when the "government's own mes-
sage is being delivered. 76
Instead, the Court concluded that the LSC program is more similar
to the Rosenberger program and falls into the limited public forum clas-
sification where viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional. 77 Notwith-
standing, the Court was unable to conclude that the purpose of the LSC
was to "encourage a diversity of views," as the Court determined in Ro-
78senberger.
71. The relevant part of § 504(a)(16) states:
None of the funds appropriated in this Act to the Legal Services Corporation may be used
to provide financial assistance to any person or entity ... that initiates legal representation
or participates in any other way, in litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort
to reform a Federal or State welfare system, except that this paragraph shall not be
construed to preclude a recipient from representing an individual eligible client who is
seeking relief from a welfare agency if such relief does not involve an effort to amend or
otherwise challenge existing law.
(emphasis added).
72. See supra notes 13-16, 66, 71-73 and accompanying text.
73. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d. at 769. See also Omnibus Consolidated Rescission and
Appropriations Act of 1996, § 504(a)(16) (the qualification states that the representation could not
"involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law.").
74. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).
75. Legal Servs. Corp. 121 S. Ct. at 1049 (comparing the LSC program with the student
activity fee fund in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
Cf. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (explaining
that viewpoint based funding decisions are allowed when the government itself is the speaker).
76. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1048-49.
77. See id. at 1049.
78. Id.
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Further, the Court looked at the role of the LSC funded lawyer.79
The Court explained that Congress funded LSC recipients to enable law-
yers to "represent the interests of indigent clients."86 The Court found that
the LSC funded "lawyer is not the government's speaker," but is instead
one who "speaks on the behalf of his or her private, indigent client."8'
Therefore, the Court held that LSC funded a limited public forum and
that restrictions viewpoint discriminatory in nature should be held un-
constitutional.
Next, the Court briefly addressed why this particular restriction was
viewpoint discriminatory.82 The Court explained that the "restriction op-
erates to insulate current welfare laws from constitutional scrutiny and
certain other legal challenges, a condition implicating central First
Amendment concerns. 83 Furthermore, the Court asserted that the "Con-
stitution does not permit the Government to confine litigants and their
attorneys in this manner.'" The Court warned that they "must be vigi-
lant" when our legislature passes laws and restrictions that "insulate its
own laws from legitimate judicial" challenges."
2. Mission of judiciary function
The important role lawyers play in society provided a second reason
for the Court to conclude that the restriction violated the First Amend-
ment. 86 The Court proclaimed that under the "canons of professional re-
sponsibility," a lawyer is mandated to exercise "independent judgment
on behalf of the client," and the lawyer will be "free of state control".87
The Court also explained that interpretation of the law and of the
Constitution is the "primary mission of the judiciary.88 Therefore, if the
restriction were deemed constitutional, the Court reasoned, cases pre-
sented by LSC funded lawyers would be unable to argue before the court









87. Id. (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981)).
88. Id. at 1050 (citing the holding in Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, 137, 177 (1803)).
89. Id. at 1051.
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3. Government must first determine the purpose of a particular me-
dium before attempting to impose restrictions.
Here, the Court found that the legal profession might be analogous
to the press, as trades given broad First Amendment protection.90 The
Court paralleled this case with its decisions in two recent broadcasting
cases, which held that prohibitions on broadcasts were impermissible
viewpoint restrictions." The Court concluded that the First Amendment
"forbade" the government from suppressing "speech inherent in the na-
ture" of the broadcast medium.92
Similarly, the Court also compared LSC with limited public forum
cases addressing student publications, concluding that while certain re-
strictions may be necessary, those restrictions cannot be viewpoint dis-
criminatory.93 The Court analogized the broadcast and student publica-
tion cases to LSC by reasoning that this LSC restriction "distorts the le-
gal system by altering the traditional role of lawyers in much the same
way broadcast systems or student publication networks were changed"
when restrictions were imposed. 94
4. No alternative representation is available to client if counsel is
forced to withdraw due to LSC restrictions.
Here, the Court made a public policy argument, claiming that if an
attorney is forced to withdraw from a representation due to this LSC re-
striction, "the client is unlikely to find other counsel." 95 The Court ex-
plained that Congress' intended purpose for the LSC was to make avail-
able legal assistance "to persons financially 'unable to afford"' the serv-
ices.9' Unfortunately, the Court concluded that there exists no "alterna-
tive channel for expression of the advocacy Congress seeks to restrict." 97
The Court distinguished this situation from Rust, arguing that a patient
90. See id. at 1050.
91. See id. at 1049 (discussing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984),
appeal dismissed by 468 U.S. 1205 (1984) and Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666
(1998)).
92. Id. at 1051 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 396-97
(1984)).
93. See id. at 1050. See also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
94. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051. Cf Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 666;
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819 (discussing First Amendment violations of program restrictions in
broadcasting and student newspapers).
95. LegalServs, Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051.
96. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2) (2001)).
97. Id.
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could receive abortion counseling through a different organization not
funded by Title X.9'
5. The argument that restrictions are necessary to define the scope
of the LSC program is unconvincing.
Finally, the Court concluded that the restriction was not necessary to
define the scope of the LSC program.99 It reasoned, "Congress cannot
recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every
case," otherwise, the First Amendment would be reduced to a "simple
semantic exercise."' '
C. Dissenting opinion
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, '0' claimed that Rust is in-
distinguishable from the instant case, and thus "compels the conclusion
that § 504(a)(16) is constitutional."'0 2 First, Scalia contended that like the
Rust program, the LSC Act does not create a limited public forum en-
couraging a "diversity of views."'' 3 Additionally, he argued that the LSC
restriction does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint because it
funds "neither challenges to nor defenses of existing welfare law."' ° In-
stead, the prohibition acts to restrict subsidizing one kind of litigation.' 5
Second, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's assertion that
the welfare funding restriction seeks to control a medium of expression
traditionally found to be a public forum for free speech. 6 He found the
analogies to the broadcasting and student newspaper cases unconvincing
and misplaced.'0 7
Finally, the majority's assertion that a welfare recipient will be un-
likely to find other counsel troubled the dissenters.'08 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the restriction leaves the welfare recipient in "no worse con-
dition than he would have been in had the LSC program never been en-
98. See id. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (discussing that patients can
seek out other options for abortion counseling).
99. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051.
100. Id. at 1052.
101. See id. at 1053-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., &
Thomas, J.).
102. Id. at 1055.
103. Id. Cf. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (discussing the similarities between Title X and LSC
programs).
104. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1055.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1055-56.
107. See id. at 1056 (distinguishing the instant case from Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995); and FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984)).
108. See Legal Servs. Corp. at 1057.
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acted."' 9 He concluded that "the LSC subsidy neither prevents anyone
from speaking nor coerces anyone to change speech," and is indistin-
guishable from Rust."0 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, the LSC restric-
tion should be declared constitutional."'
V. ANALYSIS
While the outcome of this case should be applauded, the Court's rea-
soning should have been more forthright. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court once again failed to clarify the framework for courts to use in ex-
amining constitutional challenges to restrictions placed on government
programs, thereby leaving the door open for lower courts to construe
such challenges in a myriad of ways. Instead of skirting around the legal
issues, as the majority did in coming to their decision, the Court should
have boldly and clearly explained the appropriate classifications and
factors to be considered in properly ruling on the constitutionality of
each restriction. Given the confusing state in which the law concerning
the constitutionality of restrictions on government programs exists today,
there are several conclusions that can be drawn from this most recent
decision, as well as other Supreme Court cases addressing the issue.
A. Public policy dictates whether a certain restriction is unconstitutional
based on viewpoint discrimination.
Over the past few decades, the Justices on both the conservative and
liberal sides of the Court, depending on the subject matter, have success-
fully argued that a particular restriction is unconstitutional when view-
point discriminatory. Furthermore, these recent opinions have directly
created the current confusing state of the law in this area.
For example, in Rust the restriction centered on abortion, a highly
controversial topic in our courts today."12 Since Roe v. Wade,"3 the con-
servative members of the Court steadily have attempted to limit access to
abortion and public information regarding abortion.' '" Rust provided an-
other opportunity to restrict access to information regarding abortions."'
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a conservative
member of the Court, based its conclusion on a viewpoint discrimination
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1058 (concluding that the holding in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) is
indistinguishable from the present case).
111. See id.
112. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-78.
113. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
114. See C. Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe'd To Confusion: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30
Hou. L. REV. 1457, 1467-75 (1993) (detailed discussion of the last twenty years of abortion
jurisprudence).
115. See Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech
Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1725
(1995) (arguing that the Rust decision more clearly articulated the Court's emerging view that
abortion is "no longer a fundamental right.").
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First Amendment analysis."6 However, because of the ambiguities pres-
ent in this line of cases,"7 the Court successfully argued that the pro-
gram's purpose was to convey government messages,"' and thus classi-
fied the Title X program as a nonpublic forum. In conclusion, the Court
held the program's viewpoint discriminatory abortion restriction consti-
tutional." 9
Conversely, the Court's conservative members aligned to reach the
opposite conclusion of that in Rust in three more recent cases.'20 In
Lamb's Chapel and Milford, religious groups' access to school facilities
was the central issue, another highly controversial topic in the courts
today.' In contrast to Rust, the Court concluded that a school district
opening its facilities creates a limited public forum, rather than a non-
public forum.' By framing the issue in this manner, the Court had pre-
determined its conclusion. Thus, the Court determined that the restriction
excluding religious groups from meeting on school facilities constituted
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
2 3
In Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 124 public policy considerations
once again dictated the Court's decision. This time, however, the liberal
side of the Court successfully argued unconstitutional viewpoint dis-
crimination."" The legal profession and litigation were the disputed
topic.126 The Court again concluded that the LSC's intended purpose
placed the program into the limited public forum classification. 2 Thus,
because the qualification on the welfare restriction discriminated based
on viewpoint, the restriction violated the First Amendment's free speech
clause.'2
Another interesting distinction that the Legal Servs. Corp. opinion
pointed out was the supposedly apparent differences between the ethical
obligations of the medical and legal professionals. 29 In Rust, the dis-
senting opinion sensibly argued that the "physician has an ethical obliga-
116. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
117. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
118. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
119. See id.
120. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, 2001 WL 636202, (U.S. June
11, 2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
121. See Milford, 2001 WL 636202, at *1; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386.
122. See Milford, 2001 WL 636202, at *5 (contrasting with the reasoning in Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
123. See id at *6.
124. 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).
125. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1043.
126. See id. at 1046.
127. See id. at 1052.
128. See id. at 1050.
129. See id. at 1049-50.
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tion to help the patient make choices from among the therapeutic alter-
natives consistent with good medical practice," yet the majority opinion
failed to be swayed by this argument. "°
In Legal Servs. Corp., the Court discussed the legal profession's
ethical obligations in support of its holding, thereby distinguishing it
from Rust."' The Court stressed the legal profession's "canons of profes-
sional responsibility," which mandates the lawyer exercise "independent
judgment on behalf of the client," implying a differentiation between
legal and medical professions.1
2
But, in fact, both physicians and lawyers are professionals with
similar ethical obligations, including the requirement of making inde-
pendent judgments. For physicians, courts have held that government
restrictions conflict with the obligation to make independent medical
judgments because a physician's professional ethics require that he have
free and complete exercise of his medical judgment and skill.'33 Simi-
larly, courts have held that a lawyer's "professional judgment in render-
ing" legal services cannot be directed or regulated by the person who
recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer.343
It appears that the majority in both cases passed over the ethical re-
sponsibilities of the medical profession in order to support their position.
The Rust majority was so compelled to further restrict access to abortion
counseling, and in Legal Servs. Corp., the majority was so intent on pro-
claiming the welfare restriction unconstitutional by way of the virtues of
litigation, that each time the Court failed to perceive the obvious simi-
larities between the medical and legal professional obligations.
Public policy considerations take center stage in determining whether
a restriction violates the First Amendment. The viewpoint discrimination
analysis is so wrought with ambiguities that at this juncture, it is foresee-
able that nearly every issue presented before the Court could be argued
viewpoint discriminatory in nature and therefore unconstitutional.
130. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 214 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting AM. MED.
ASS'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CURRENT OPINIONS OF COUNCIL ON ETHICAL
AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION P8.08 (1989)).
131. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1049-51.
132. Id. (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981)).
133. See Quilico v. Kaplan, 749 F.2d 480, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1984); Lurch v. United States, 719
F.2d 333, 337 (10th Cir. 1983). See also Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE LJ. 151, 172-
73 (1996) (analyzing physician cases discussing this issue).
134. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981). See also Post, supra note 133, at 172-
73 (further discussing the ethical and professional responsibilities of a lawyer); supra notes 60-65,
87-89, 131-32 and accompanying text.
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B. The Court's holding in Legal Servs. Corp. likely will have minimal
effect on the LSC program.
Originally, the plaintiffs in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez sought a
preliminary injunction against four of the 1996 restrictions.' While the
Supreme Court holding may appear as a victory at first glance, those
plaintiffs brave enough to initially challenge the LSC restrictions likely
did not feel properly remedied.
36
From its inception, LSC proponents have battled with Republican
Congressmen and women to keep LSC a viable program.'37 To continue
receiving funding, LSC supporters have been forced to compromise with
more conservative factions, allowing the implementation of program
restrictions. 3 8 Only a few renegade LSC lawyers have resisted the whit-
tling away of the LSC program's core. 3 9 Thus, the LSC's recent success
in the Supreme Court does little to return the LSC program back to its
1974 stature.
However, even with this minimal victory, supporters who have
hesitated to openly oppose new restrictions may find the courage to
challenge the constitutionality of further LSC restrictions. With a Su-
preme Court opinion serving as precedent backing LSC supporters, con-
servative Congressmen and women bent on "de-funding" the program
may hesitate to impose additional restrictions or may gravitate towards
attacking other liberal legislative programs.'9 Once again the Court could
have clarified to supporters and opponents of the LSC the possibility that
other restrictions violated the Constitution if they had been more forth-
right in their opinion. However, both sides are now more befuddled than
ever about the question of the constitutionality of a certain restriction.
C. A New Analytical Model for Subsidized Speech & Viewpoint dis-
crimination cases
Based on the recent trend of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to
cases involving viewpoint discrimination and subsidized speech, a simi-
lar case likely will be presented before the Court in the near future, pro-
viding another opportunity for the Court to clarify the legal framework
for constitutional challenges to restrictions on government programs.
Such a case would provide an opportunity for the Court to redeem itself
135. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999), affid, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). See supra notes 66-68
and accompanying text.
136. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. 1046 (holding that a clause of one of the 1996
restrictions violated the First Amendment).
137. See Roth, supra note 60, at 108-09.
138. See id. at 108.
139. See id. at 109.
140. See id.
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from the criticism discussed earlier, and boldly assert a working model
for these types of constitutional challenges. Below outlines a potential
framework that the Court should consider asserting in future cases.
Three legal determinations should be made to ascertain the consti-
tutionality of a particular government restriction. First, the Court must
characterize the relationship between the government and the grantee of
the government's subsidy. Second, the disputed restriction must be clas-
sified as viewpoint neutral or viewpoint discriminatory. Third, additional
factors need to be taken into consideration to determine if a certain gov-
ernment program should be specially protected.
1. Classifying the relationship between the government and the
grantee of the government's subsidy.
The relationship between the government and the grantee should be
classified as either in the nonpublic forum or limited public forum realm.
In the past, the Court has deemed this classification important and has
affirmatively used these categories, but it ultimately failed to provide
clear guidelines to determine what category a specific subsidy falls un-
der. To assist in determining the appropriate classification, courts should
look at the following factors: legislative history, the area being subsi-




First, a court should examine the subsidy's legislative history to ac-
curately determine the classification, looking specifically for several
items. If Congress "conceptualized persons as means to an end rather
than as autonomous agents," or if the "attainment of institutional ends"
was deemed an "unquestioned priority," the subsidy may fall within the
nonpublic forum classification. 142
In addition, a court should characterize the area being subsidized to
determine the proper classification of the subsidy. For example, subsidies
addressing freedom of expression seriously limit the government's abil-
ity to regulate through restrictions. 4 3 The original Constitution and its
Amendments decree the utmost deference by Congress. Any subsidy
regarding the Constitution, therefore, most likely will fall under the lim-
ited public forum classification.
2. Classifying the restriction as viewpoint neutral or viewpoint dis-
criminatory
After determining the proper classification of the government sub-
sidy as either in a nonpublic forum or limited public forum, only then
141. This list should not be seen as exhaustive.
142. See Post, supra note 133, at 171.
143. See id.
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does the concept of viewpoint discrimination become important. Gov-
ernment program restrictions falling under the nonpublic forum classifi-
cation can be both viewpoint discriminatory and constitutional while
those falling under the limited public forum classification can be deemed
unconstitutional if viewpoint discriminatory. While the Court has occa-
sionally alluded to this differentiation, it also has befuddled the area by
forbidding viewpoint discrimination whenever it occurs within subsidies
relating to speech, regardless of its classification as either a nonpublic or
limited public forum.'" In the next case the Court decides, the majority
must clearly assert that viewpoint discrimination is allowed in nonpublic
forum subsidies.
To accurately classify a restriction as viewpoint neutral or viewpoint
discriminatory, several factors can be looked at to simplify this charac-
terization. First, a court should determine if the speaker's "ideology,
opinion, or perspective," rather than the subject matter of the speech, is
being limited by the restriction. 45 If the subsidy restriction involves the
discrimination of a particular speaker's perspective, then it constitutes
viewpoint discrimination; if the restriction discriminates against the en-
tire spectrum of a particular subject matter, then the discrimination is
viewpoint neutral and therefore content discriminatory. Overall, only
viewpoint discriminatory restrictions can be held unconstitutional.
3. Addressing additional factors to determine if a certain subsidy
should receive special protection.
When a court has completed the first two legal determinations of
this framework, it should further explore the subsidy and restriction to
decide whether it deserves special protection. Certain industries, trades
and professions should be given special consideration in this analysis.
The Court has already determined that government subsidies relating to
the press deserve special protection.'4 Additionally, the Court, in Legal
Servs. Corp., followed a long line of cases that granted lawyers a special
degree of protection. 
47
Other industries and professions also deserve this special protection,
and case law and the Constitution provide a guide to appropriately de-
termine which industries and professions should receive this protected
status. Physicians are the most obvious profession deserving this recog-
144. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147-48
(1993). See also Post, supra note 133, at 164-65 (explaining that the general principle forbidding
viewpoint discrimination with respect to subsidized speech is false).
145. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). See also
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). See also supra note 39
and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 60-65, 87-89 and accompanying text.
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nition." Other areas, however, likely deserve special consideration.
Therefore, addressing these additional factors to determine a possible
protected status must be included in such a legal analysis.
By and large, following this legal framework for constitutional chal-
lenges to restrictions on government programs should clarify the current
confusing state of First Amendment jurisprudence. While this framework
can by no means completely ease the tensions that exist in this area of the
law, it should assist the courts in more fairly determining the constitu-
tionality of a particular subsidy restriction.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is exciting that the Court's liberal justices and LSC sup-
porters can claim a small victory with their holding in Legal Servs. Corp.
v. Velazquez,4 9 in reality, mixed results will likely flow from the Court's
decision. With this opinion, the Court has thoroughly complicated the
law regarding the constitutionality of viewpoint discriminatory restric-
tions, and lower courts are now faced with an even more confusing legal
framework to work from. This decision demonstrates an even more com-
pelling need for the Court to lay out a comprehensive legal framework
for constitutional challenges to restrictions on government programs.
Only after the Court establishes a more comprehensible framework
can free speech advocates effectively challenge the constitutionality of
other subsidy restrictions. Until that time, no party who brings a consti-
tutional challenge to such restrictions can predict the ultimate ruling.
Liberal free speech advocates must contain their excitement with the
current decision and join with other First Amendment supporters,
whether a racist, a journalist or a politician, and show their dissatisfac-
tion with the majority opinion, thereby encouraging the Supreme Court
to hear another case in order to clarify the current state of law. Only then
will all First Amendment proponents feel secure that First Amendment
rights are protected impartially.
Carrie S. Bernstein
148. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text. Although the Court failed to extend this
protected status to physicians in Rust, the Court should look for an upcoming case involving the
medical profession to remedy this lapse in judgment.
149. 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).

